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explosive ordnance, with particular focus on mines, cluster munitions, other
explosive remnants of war and ammunition storage. The Centre helps develop
and professionalise the sector for the benefits of its partners: national and
local authorities, donors, the United Nations, other international and regional
organisations, non-governmental organisations, commercial companies and
academia. It does so by combining three distinct lines of service: field support
focused on capacity development and advice, multilateral work focused on norms
and standards, and research and development focused on cutting-edge solutions.
Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 70 staff
members from 23 different countries. This makes it a unique and international centre
of expertise and knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions,
project funding and in-kind support from more than 30 governments and
organisations.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The aim of this guide is to provide an introduction to Non-Technical Survey
(NTS) for mine action personnel who wish to learn more about the subject,
but who may lack practical experience. This guide collects the lessons
learnt from the development and standardisation of the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Non-Technical Survey Training
Course and will form part of the pre-course reading material. It aims to
provide course participants with a better understanding of the theory
and practice of NTS operations. The importance of the practical training
cannot be overstated, and this guide is not meant to replace it, but rather
to complement and support it. This guide is also intended to complement
IMAS Chapter 07.11 Land Release and IMAS Chapter 08.10 Non-Technical
Survey. This guide will be updated as needed in the future with a spirit of
a continuous improvement process.
NTS is an important component of the Land Release (LR) process. Typically,
NTS is the first operational step in implementing an LR process and, as such,
it can be seen as the foundation upon which all subsequent LR activities are
based. NTS consists of gathering information from desk assessments and
field visits. This information forms the basis of a logical, evidence-based,
decision-making process that allows surveyors to classify any area that is
surveyed as either being free from any suspicion of Explosive Ordnance
(EO) or being a Suspected or Confirmed Hazardous Area (SHA or CHA).
Where there is doubt about the reliability of previously identified hazardous
areas based on outdated survey data, NTS is an important tool to test the
evidence on which these previously identified hazardous areas may be
cancelled in whole or in part.
In the context of LR, NTS is not a stand-alone process; it is closely connected
to Technical Survey, clearance, post-Land Release assessment, operations
quality management and Information Management. All of these activities
and related processes typically follow on from NTS and can all be seen as

8
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forms of comprehensive quality management for NTS, either confirming or
not the NTS findings. The follow-on activities will either prove or disprove
the reliability of the evidence collected during NTS and therefore enable
the survey process to continually improve. All cancelled, reduced and
cleared areas should be subject to follow-up assessment as part of the
quality management system (facilitated by the Information Management
[IM] system).
NTS does not involve any search or ground processing assets entering any
area that is potentially hazardous, therefore it is significantly less expensive
than Technical Survey (TS) and clearance operations. NTS is the most costefficient component of the LR process and should be prioritised over TS
and clearance whenever possible.
The type and quality of evidence found during NTS will determine
the overall outcome of the survey. If NTS finds direct evidence of EO
contamination, the result will be a CHA associated to a polygon, or a
reported spot Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) task; whereas indirect
evidence would produce a SHA. If no evidence is found in any part of a
previously identified hazardous area based on outdated survey data, the
recommendation would be made to cancel the relevant portion of the area.
If no evidence is found in a newly surveyed area, that area will be recorded
(geotagged) as having been surveyed but no additional LR process would
be undertaken.
All information collected during the NTS process should be accurately
recorded with sufficient details, and subject to internal quality controls
before being entered into the IM system. The raw data itself should be
retained by a competent authority, in case of any subsequent need for a
review of the decision-making process. Information collected during NTS
should be available in the format specified by the national mine action
authority (NMAA).

Executive summary
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INTRODUCTION
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 07.11 defines Land Release as:
“…the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove
all presence and suspicion of Explosive Ordnance through non-technical survey,
technical survey and/or clearance”.
Land Release (LR) in humanitarian mine action is an evidence-based, decisionmaking process that is used to declare with confidence that land is free of
Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination according to nationally agreed norms.
Once an LR policy has been approved by a state, national mine action standards
(NMAS) are developed which provide specifications and guidelines regarding the
implementation of the process. As mine action is a set of complex and variable
activities that differ from country to country, there is no single template that can
be applied to every situation.
In the majority of countries, Non-Technical Survey (NTS) is typically the first step
in the LR process and as such, every mine action activity that follows is based
on the accuracy of the evidence collected during NTS. NTS can be seen as the
foundation upon which most subsequent mine action activities are built, and its
importance cannot be overstated. Implementing NTS to the highest standards
is of fundamental importance to the effectiveness and efficiency with which the
remainder of the LR process is applied.
As the starting point for land assessment, NTS categorises areas based on whether
or not there is any evidence that EO contamination exists within them. Areas are
then recorded as either being free from any suspicion of EO contamination or as
being Suspected or Confirmed Hazardous Areas (SHAs or CHAs). NTS may also
identify individual items of EO and define these individual items as being spot
tasks, not associated with polygons, requiring further Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) action but not requiring Technical Survey (TS) or clearance.
NTS can be broken down into eight elements, as shown in the diagram at page 19.
NTS begins with a desk assessment, where all requests from the community,
area maps, accident reports, previous survey reports and any other information
is collected and analysed to determine whether it is necessary to conduct a field
visit. It is possible that the desk assessment may not result in a field visit, which
may be the case if the desk assessment shows that the location in question cannot
correspond to any conceivable contaminated area. An example of this might be a
10
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Non-Technical Survey Training, Thailand, 2016

site that is several kilometres off the coast of a country, indicating that erroneous
coordinates have previously been entered into the Information Management (IM)
system.
Pre-deployment planning would normally follow on from the desk assessment.
Deployments generally begin with a meeting with the local community, from
which decisions can be taken about where to conduct specific site visits, if there
is general information to suggest that EO contamination is present. The site visit
primarily consists of gathering evidence and information by questioning local
communities, as well as through physical inspection from a safe area. Once
information is gathered from community members or any other source, it is
assessed for reliability and accuracy before being entered into a standard NTS
report. The NTS report is checked for any errors and omissions before being
entered into the IM system.
All elements of NTS revolve around identifying, accessing, collecting, classifying,
reporting and using information to help define where EO is to be found, as well
as where there is no evidence of contamination. The information collected during
A Guide to Non-Technical Survey
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NTS supports the land cancellation, reduction and clearance decision-making
processes. It is just as important for an NTS team to identify areas that are not
showing evidence of EO contamination, as it is to identify areas that are suspected
or confirmed as being contaminated.
NTS may produce enough evidence on its own to allow the determination to
be made, with confidence, that the land does not contain an EO hazard. If the
requirements to apply “all reasonable effort” have been met, the land can be
cancelled. IMAS provides guidance on what can be considered as “all reasonable
effort” for NTS but it is ultimately the responsibility of the national mine action
authority to clarify and determine what that means in individual countries.
As NTS does not involve the use of any search or ground processing assets
entering an area, it is significantly less expensive than TS and clearance. When
compared to TS and clearance, NTS can also have the greatest impact, measured
in terms of square metres of land released (cancelled). The use of NTS should,
wherever possible, be the first step in the LR process.
NTS should be closely connected to any subsequent activities within the LR
process. The continual improvement of NTS processes and procedures is reliant
upon an analysis of the accuracy of the information collected during survey against
what is actually found (or not found) during the technical processes. The longerterm monitoring of areas following handover also helps the continual improvement
of the entire LR process.
It is important to understand the importance of developing NMAS that are both
IMAS compliant and context specific.
This guide aims to achieve the following goals:
a. Ensure a comprehensive understanding of NTS (terminology, processes,

and reporting).
b. Form the basis for continual improvement of NTS operations and NTS

Standard Operating Procedures.
c. Form the basis for development of the NTS training curriculum/packages.
d. Promote the efficient implementation of NTS, which is fully NMAS

compliant.

12
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LAND RELEASE CONCEPT
All authorities, agencies and operators involved in Explosive Ordnance (EO) remediation should do their utmost to ensure that resources are deployed in the most
operationally efficient manner possible. Operational resources are expensive and
limited and their efficient deployment ensures that they offer the best return on
investment for all parties, including donors and beneficiaries.
The world of EO contamination is complex, so achieving better operational efficiency can also be complex, and is highly dependent upon local circumstances.
Nonetheless, one of the primary ways of achieving better operational efficiency
is to implement the concepts and practices of Land Release (LR).
LR essentially involves implementing intrusive methods of inspection only when
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an EO hazard may exist. The LR process
is a logical process that begins with the initial identification of an EO threat (or of
the lack of an EO threat). It then seeks to define the nature and extent of any EO
threat before applying all reasonable effort to show with confidence that any
EO threat that did exist, has been removed.

Survey team interviewing a farmer, Colombia, 2012
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The nature and level of the reasonable effort required in the framework of national
mine action standards to implement the LR process is dependent upon:
• the specific local circumstances and conditions;
• what part of the LR process was last carried out and;
• the implications of any new information discovered as the process

progresses.
As previously discussed, it is possible that the desk assessment alone may indicate
that a previously identified hazardous areas based on outdated survey data cannot
exist in a given location. In this instance, the desk assessment could be defined as
constituting all reasonable effort, once it has been subject to the relevant quality
management (QM) processes.
Practical effort is applied through Non-Technical Survey (NTS), Technical Survey
(TS) and clearance. The process typically begins with NTS and then progresses on
to TS and then on to clearance, but there is no requirement for it to follow any set
sequence, as each set of circumstances is different. Operational decision makers
should keep the idea of operational efficiency at the forefront of all planning and
ensure that they retain the flexibility to react to new information as it becomes
available. It is not uncommon for a single task to go through multiple stages of
NTS, TS and clearance before it is concluded that all reasonable effort has been
made and the land can be released.
NTS typically establishes whether or not there is evidence of an EO hazard, its
general nature and approximate location, through the creation of a Suspected
Hazardous Area (SHA), or Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) if there is direct
evidence of the existence of EO contamination. TS typically follows NTS and tries
to gather more evidence, with the goal of establishing the precise nature of the
hazard, the precise area the hazard is contained in and any factors that may affect
the operational decisions relating to the clearance process. If TS confirms the
presence of an EO hazard, or other kinds of direct evidence within an SHA, a CHA
report would be produced. The CHA would normally be expected to be smaller
and better defined than the preceding SHA. Clearance builds on the information
from NTS and TS and ensures that the EO hazard has been removed from a
specified area to a specified depth or other agreed parameters, as stipulated by
the national mine action authority (NMAA)/Tasking Authority. However, in some
cases, the CHA may be larger than the initial SHA, as the result of new evidence
discovered through TS. This is important to note, as it is a common operational
mistake to assume that new evidence would always reduce the size of the area
that needs to be processed.
14
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FIGURE 1

ELEMENTS OF THE LAND RELEASE PROCESS

Non-technical
survey

Technical
survey

© GICHD 2019

The LR process should be supported by an effective Information Management
(IM) system that:
• ensures that data are collected accurately and consistently;
• facilitates reporting in compliance with all required formats and schedules;
• ensures that information is entered correctly into databases, after having

been subjected to quality checks;
• analyses the data to provide reliable IM services to an organisation’s

programme and operation management units and any other stakeholders
requiring the information and;
• disseminates the information in a timely manner to those that require it.

Authorities and operators should actively identify, access and use all relevant sources
of data, information and analysis in support of the LR process.

A Guide to Non-Technical Survey
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In addition to the details of “what was found where” that are collected, recorded
and reported, authorities and agencies should ensure that the information is
analysed to help identify trends, patterns or other characteristics that can help
decision makers make valid, efficient decisions based on actual evidence, thereby
increasing confidence in the LR process.
Where data indicate shortcomings in the LR process, those data should be used
to support continual improvement of procedures, practice and policies.
The LR process requires decisions to be made in real world situations, which
frequently do not offer simple, clearly defined circumstances. The nature of an EO
hazard and the way in which it is distributed is key to determining how to maximise
the efficiency and effectiveness of the LR process.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) contain guidance on all aspects of
the LR process:
• IMAS 07.10 (Guide for the management of Land Release and Residual

Contamination Operations) provides a broad overview of the stages of an
LR operation
• IMAS 07.11 (Land Release) outlines the entire process of LR
• IMAS 08.10 (Non-Technical Survey) provides specific guidance on the

principles of NTS
• IMAS 08.20 (Technical Survey) provides specific guidance on the principles

of TS, the conduct of TS, and outlines how land can be reduced through TS
• IMAS 09.10 (Clearance requirements) provides the requirements for the

conduct of clearance and the release of land through clearance
• IMAS 09.11 (Battle Area Clearance) provides the requirements for the

conduct of Battle Area Clearance and the release of land through Battle
Area Clearance

16
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NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY – GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
Non-Technical Survey (NTS) aims to provide accurate, evidence-based information
regarding the presence or absence of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination.
NTS further aims to provide detailed information on context-adapted reporting
forms about the nature of a Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) or Confirmed
Hazardous Area (CHA), including its exact location, its size, the nature of expected
EO hazards, patterns of EO, special features (trenches, river banks, fox holes,
etc.), security, medical support, local environment and infrastructure. NTS is often
carried out jointly with Community Liaison teams, in which case the NTS teams
are also responsible for collecting impact-related data, which can be used in task
prioritisation.
The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for each operator should be in
compliance with national mine action standards (NMAS) and contain as much
clarity as possible on what constitutes direct and indirect evidence in the specific
country context, as this can vary considerably between countries. It is strongly
suggested that national mine action authorities (NMAAs) and operators develop
country-specific evidence guides consistent with the national reporting forms.
The operator’s SOPs should also emphasise the training, qualifications and
competencies that NTS staff are required to have. In addition, the SOPs should
specify how these requirements will be quality assured and recorded. NTS is a
specific discipline within LR, which requires specific training in both hard and soft
skills; it should only be undertaken by suitably qualified, trained and equipped
teams.
SOPs and NMAS should specify how NTS is incorporated into the overall Land
Release (LR) concept and processes. They should also ensure that NTS is incorporated into both internal and external quality management systems and Information
Management.
If dealing with previously identified hazardous areas based on outdated survey
data, NTS has the potential to cancel those areas, or parts thereof, if the evidence
justifies doing so.
There should never be a requirement for NTS teams to enter a potentially
hazardous area. The entire NTS process should be carried out from safe ground,
including site visits and interaction with informants. Likewise, informants should
A Guide to Non-Technical Survey
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always be asked to indicate the area from safe ground, rather than taking the NTS
team into any potentially hazardous area. Informants may include local authorities,
local community members, ex-combatants and local security forces.
In circumstances where the primary evidence source is the local population, but
that local population is no longer present, there is little to be gained from carrying
out a field visit. If a field visit were to be implemented, it would almost invariably
result in the need to return at a later date. There may, however, be circumstances
where the desk study alone, in the absence of any local population, has produced
sufficient evidence, such as aerial photography or minefield records, to justify the
decision to implement Technical Survey (TS) operations.
Some operators have embedded a small TS or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
component within NTS teams, as determined by local circumstances. This is
especially relevant in areas where single items of EO have been moved by local
people and placed out of context. The TS or EOD component is often able to deal
with single items (spot tasks), therefore increasing the efficiency of operations
by negating the need for any other future LR process. This refers to IMAS 08.20
(Technical Survey) and 09.30 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal – EOD), respectively,
and are outside the scope of this guide. NTS teams may be tasked with delivering
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) collecting data on victims and similar
tasks, where appropriate.
Once an area has undergone any form of intrusive intervention, the results of that
intervention should be compared to the evidence collected during NTS. This will
indicate the reliability (or otherwise) of NTS and allow for any revisions to the NTS
process as a whole to be undertaken, including NTS staff training. The results
of any subsequent technical intervention can be seen as validation of the NTS
process, creating a feedback loop and leading to continual improvement of the
NTS process.

18
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NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY PROCESS
FIGURE 2

NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY PROCESS

1
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As seen in the diagram above, the NTS process consists of eight steps:
• Desk assessment
• Pre-deployment planning
• Village/stakeholder meeting
• Field visit
• Assessment of findings
• Reporting and debrief
• Internal quality management (QM) of reporting
• Compiling and submitting reports
A Guide to Non-Technical Survey
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Desk assessment
Desk assessment is the collection of all possible, relevant data that are available.
It can be considered to be a broader analysis of the NTS context, including the type
and likely usage of Explosive Ordnance (EO) hazards likely to be encountered, but
also historical and socio-economic data. It is carried out in advance of the field visit
and is part of the planning process for the field visit. Typically, desk assessments
involve a review of any previous mine action reports from in and around the area to
be visited. This includes previously recorded Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs)/
Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs), clearance or suspension reports and accident
reports. Clearly, there will be a requirement to access any existing information that
is available in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), or
its local equivalent.
Desk assessments should also gather topographical information from any available
maps and satellite imagery. This information is to be used, not only to get an idea
of the area to be visited, but also to plan routes in and out. If the past conflict
involved the creation of defensive works, satellite or unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) imagery can indicate the position of these, which can greatly assist an NTS
team to narrow down the likely locations of minefields. Large defensive positions
are also more likely to have been the target of air-delivered weapons and/or land
service ammunition (LSA), so there is the possibility that these locations may have
both mine and other EO contamination.
There are sometimes country-specific sources of information that may be
available during the desk assessment phase. For example, in some countries,
local newspapers often have stories of mine accidents that have not been reported
elsewhere. Some countries may also have access to minefield records or bombing
data which, if reliable, can provide a very effective starting point for a desk study.
An organisational or programme-wide gender and diversity analysis should also
be included as input to the desk assessment stage. This helps to ensure that the
team composition reflects the gender and diversity balance in the community and,
therefore, results in the team accessing the most complete information possible.
It is entirely possible, especially when dealing with previously identified hazardous
areas based on outdated survey data, that the desk assessment may determine
that there is no need for a field visit to take place, and the SHA may then be
cancelled. Reasons for this may be as simple as duplicate entries entered into the
Information Management (IM) system, or incorrect coordinates for the previously
identified erroneous SHA, placing it in an unlikely area, such as out to sea.

20
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Pre-deployment planning
If the desk assessment establishes that there is enough information to justify a field
visit, pre-deployment planning needs to be carried out, in coordination with or at
the request of the national mine action authority. This involves planning routes in
and out and trying to establish, wherever possible, advance communication with
the location to be visited. If this communication can be established, the team
can request suitable dates and times to visit to ensure that there is the maximum
possible community involvement.
The team’s equipment needs to be checked to ensure that it is all in working order
and that the team is in possession of spare batteries, etc. There are countries
where it would also be appropriate to ensure that the security situation allows
NTS teams to operate.

Village/stakeholder meeting
On arriving in a new community, a meeting should be organised to try to involve
as many community members as possible, including the head of the community
and representatives from different social and gender/age groups and ethnicities,
where relevant. Cultural sensitivity also plays an important role in ensuring the
success, or failure, of the field visit. An effective gender and diversity analysis

Community meeting with NPA, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2014
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helps to build trust between the NTS team and the local community, by ensuring
that the survey team adequately responds to the requirements presented by the
cultural context. In many cultures it is vital that the NTS team visits the head of the
community and other prominent community members to explain the purpose of
NTS and to ask for permission. If the leader is supportive of the goal of the NTS
team, the NTS process can be expected to go much more smoothly than would
otherwise be the case. Several visits may be required to build up confidence with
the informants and further individual meetings may take place.
The community meeting seeks to identify those community members that have
information about any local EO hazards and the approximate location(s) of such
hazards. If the community agrees that there is no local EO hazard, this information
should be recorded, and community representatives asked to confirm that they
agree with this assessment with their signatures. Finding no evidence of EO
contamination is as important as finding evidence of contamination and should
be recorded in accordance with national mine action standards (NMAS) minimum
data requirements.
The NTS team should be trained to recognise that many types of EO are not
typically found individually, these include cluster sub-munitions and mines. In
instances where the NTS team finds evidence of an individual cluster sub-munition
or a mine, this would strongly imply that more are present. However, when
individual items of EO are found, they are not to be recorded as Confirmed
Hazardous Areas. Instead, they should be recorded and reported as Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) spot tasks.

Field visits
Typically, when the community meeting has concluded and informants have been
identified, the field visits begin. In the absence of informants but with a positive
desk assessment, rigorous safety and security conditions should apply and ground
processing assets should be available. It is likely that each possible SHA will involve
a separate field visit but this depends on the size of the SHAs and how close they
are to each other. The field visits seek to confirm the accuracy, or otherwise, of all
the information collected during the desk assessment and to gather new evidence
from informants with which to determinate whether an area is contaminated
with EO, or not. If previous mine action reports of SHAs/CHAs exist, the field
visit will compare the situation on the ground to that previously reported and
note any changes that may have occurred since the reports were made. It is
during this process that land would typically be cancelled, if appropriate. The
cancellation criteria should be established in national standards and Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs).
22
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Survey team interviewing members of the local community, Cambodia, 2005

Assessment of findings
Once the field visit is completed the team is to cross-check all collected information, assess and critically analyse all findings, including information gathered
during the desk assessment, discussions with the local authority, military, police,
village meeting/community discussions, key informant interviews and field visits.
If there are no previous reports of evidence of EO contamination then it is not
possible to cancel any land. Land can only be cancelled if it was previously reported
as being contaminated with EO. Land can also be cancelled when information
gathered during the survey indicates that there is in fact no evidence of EO
contamination in previously suspected areas, and if the process is prescribed
in national standards, regulations or law. For example, some national standards
stipulate that reclaimed land, which has been ploughed a minimum of three times
since the last evidence of a mine was recorded, can be cancelled.
If an SHA/CHA has been identified, it should be marked, mapped as a polygon,
recorded and the local population debriefed before leaving the site. If for whatever
reason the access to an area is restricted, the use of aerial imagery could be used
to gather further evidence.
On returning to the office, the initial report and the maps produced should be
subject to a quality check, prior to being entered into the Information Management
(IM) system.
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Reporting and debriefing
Detailed documentation of the information and evidence is a crucial element of
NTS. Without a sufficiently accurate and robust reporting system, the survey itself
may be good but planning and priority setting will fail.

Internal QM of reporting
The national mine action authority (NMAA) establishes report forms and formats
that conform to minimum data requirements and are compatible with the national
mine action Information Management system. Each form, report and map
must be carefully checked several times to ensure its accuracy and quality. The
documentation should be reviewed and signed off by senior operational and IM
staff before being entered into the IM system and before being submitted to the
NMAA and any relevant administrative levels of authority.

Compiling and submitting reports
Once a larger geographical area has been surveyed and documents completed
and checked, a relevant summary should ideally be sent to a higher administrative
level of authority, such as district or provincial authorities. These higher-level
authorities may be able to identify possible errors and omissions in the reports.
The involvement of higher-level authorities in the process can help to improve the
relationship with the operator.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
NTS is often seen as a simple process that is purely focussed on collecting
information from the field, prior to any form of technical intervention. In fact, NTS
is a more complex, dynamic undertaking that involves the eight-step process,
followed by ongoing communication with the teams undertaking technical
interventions.
Other mine action activities, such as Risk Education and Community Liaison, can
also prove to be useful sources of information regarding Explosive Ordnance (EO)
contamination.
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Data collection and analysis
As previously discussed, data collection begins with the desk assessment.
Once this has been completed, the field visit should be scheduled. The field
visit should be structured in such a way that both male and female informants
with knowledge about potentially EO-contaminated areas are interviewed. As
determined by an analysis of the context and previous experience, separate
meetings should be arranged with households, family groups, female informants
and children respectively, as these groups might be prevented from participating
fully in mixed group meetings. The NTS team should be made up of diverse
individuals and of mixed gender, to ensure that information from different gender
and ethnic groups in the community can be gathered and cross referenced.
Part of the pre-deployment planning will be to ensure that the NTS team knows
the safe routes to the location and that it is equipped with a reliable means of
communication, to ensure that it can contact the organisation’s headquarters
in case of any problems. Many countries have seasons during which access to
certain areas is not possible, due to adverse weather conditions. NTS field visits
should take these times of year into account when scheduling field visits.
The initial stage of the NTS visit should include a meeting with a local administrator
or community leader/representative, depending on the social and government
structures in the area of operations. This can facilitate cooperation with the
affected community when done in a culturally-sensitive manner.
The NTS field visit should gather information from a number of sources, rather
than just one person. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will normally
specify that a certain minimum
number of sources is required,
to ensure confidence that the
community overall supports
the findings of NTS. The gender
and age of informants should
also be recorded, so that quality
management (QM) can determine whether or not NTS teams
are effectively reaching both
genders and all ages. The names
and contact details of all sources
should be recorded in the NTS
report, so that any future followData analysis and report checking, NTS training
up can, if required, confirm the
in Lebanon, 2018
information.
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Once the field visit has been concluded, it is important that representatives of the
local community actually sign the NTS forms to indicate that they are in agreement
with the information provided.
The NTS process does not end with the field visit; it is an ongoing process of
collecting and confirming evidence to help with the continual improvement of the
Land Release (LR) process. NTS and any technical intervention team must share
information, so that the NTS team can find out how reliable the evidence that they
have collected is and how it can be improved in the future.
It should be stressed that it is just as important for the NTS team to collect and
record evidence that supports the conclusion that there is no EO contamination
in a given area, as it is to find evidence of EO contamination. The documentation
process for determining that there is no Explosive Ordnance should be as
rigidly adhered to as for those areas where EO contamination is suspected or
confirmed. The report form will testify to how information was cross-checked,
and provides evidence of lack of contamination gathered, with the support of the
local community. If there is any future adverse event in a location where the NTS
process concluded that there was no evidence of EO contamination, it is important
to document why that decision was made, so that lessons may be learned.

Data collection in urban areas
Conflicts in urban areas present additional challenges for NTS, as collapsed
buildings and other infrastructure often conceal EO contamination, meaning that
local people are unaware of its existence. Recent conflicts have seen the extensive
use of improvised explosive devices in urban areas, which pose a hazard to NTS
teams as well as to local people.
These conflicts often produce large population movements into urban areas,
which results in a lack of local knowledge among the newly-arrived residents,
thereby creating a challenge for NTS teams. Some parts of cities may have been
subjected to a greater degree of EO contamination than other parts, which leads
to population displacement within the same urban environment. As a result,
displaced people may know more about the EO contamination in the immediate
areas of their former homes than they do about their current surroundings.
In this context, adapted standards and SOPs for NTS operations in urban areas
are required to ensure that staff involved follow special training and deployment,
and implement specifically designed operational procedures for which they are
accredited. NTS specific requirements for operations in urban areas are outside
the scope of this guide.
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Survey team conducting operations in West Mossul, Iraq, 2018

Classification of sources
Not all sources are equally reliable and some may have different motives when
giving information to the NTS team. For example, some landowners may claim
that their land is affected by EO contamination because they think that the land is
worth more money once clearance has been done. In these instances, it is vital
that information is sought from other sources to confirm that the community in
general believes that the land is contaminated and not just the landowner. The
requirement to consult confirmatory sources is often set out in SOPs and national
mine action standards (NMAS).
When dealing with sources, the NTS team should always verify that the source
lives in the relevant location and has lived there for long enough to possess useful
knowledge of the local area.
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Sources are often classified by the perceived reliability of the evidence that they
are able to provide. In many cases, SOPs will classify sources and specify that the
NTS teams should seek out specific types of sources, such as current or former
combatants with direct knowledge of the nature and location of EO contamination.
Relevant experience in the country/region will help to determine how information
sources are classified. This relevant experience often comes from comparing the
information received with the actual results of previous technical interventions,
which will indicate the previous level of reliability of similar sources elsewhere.
Once a classification system has been established, it should be reviewed at
suitable intervals to ensure that it reflects current findings from the field.

Confidence in sources and evidence
It is not unusual to find that there is conflicting information about the status of
a particular area of land, with one person claiming that it is contaminated and
another claiming that it is not. In these cases, it is important to analyse why these
people have conflicting views about the same piece of land.
The NTS team needs to be able to critically analyse the information that they
collect. For instance, if an informant claims that a road is not used, owing to the
suspicion of mines, but the NTS team member can see multiple tyre tracks or
footprints on the road, there would be little confidence in the informant, or the
information provided.
The use of land, roads or other infrastructure by local communities is an important
factor to be taken into account when assessing the accuracy and reliability of
new information. If, for example, a landowner claims that his land is mined and
requires clearance, but the land shows clear signs of being used (e.g. It has been
planted with crops or grazed by animals) the physical evidence suggests that the
information provided by the landowner is unreliable and further investigation is
required.
The use of land, roads or other infrastructure should also be considered when
cancelling parts of or whole existing hazardous areas. The precise criteria for
cancellation vary from country to country and should be specified in both national
standards and operator SOPs.
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LAND USE CATEGORIES/
PRIORITISATION
The NTS team will collect information from the local community about the different land use in the area. This is often achieved by the use of a locally produced
community map that shows the areas that are used for different types of activity,
such as cultivation, grazing, hunting, water collection, firewood collection, etc.
The different land uses will help to identify those areas to be prioritised for NTS
and any subsequent technical interventions. For example, Explosive Ordnance (EO)
contamination around a vital water source would typically be prioritised over EO
contamination in an area used for hunting, when many other hunting areas exist.
The community map can also indicate areas that were previously reported to
be contaminated with EO but are now in use. This is very useful evidence that
constitutes the first step when considering any possible cancellation of the area.

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Civil Protection team analysing completed operations and future
prioritisation with the national mine action centre, 2014
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When considering the cancellation of areas that are in use, it is important to adopt
a systematic approach that is clearly documented, so that any decision can be
shown to be evidence-based and reviewed in the future. A systematic approach
should consider the following:
a. an understanding of the type, nature and distribution of any EO

contamination in the region and especially within the immediate vicinity
of the suspected area;
b. a clear and accurate definition of the precise boundaries of the area being

used and any area not being used;
c. how the area has been used, including the depth of any intrusive activities,

and the density and intensity of human and mechanical traffic;
d. how long the area has been used for what, if at all, and which activities

have been undertaken at different times;
e. the results of the monitoring of other areas that have been similarly

assessed and previously cancelled.

Clearance activity in Sri Lanka during the rainy season. Working on previously cultivated
land will make people wonder about the quality of the initial survey

It may be possible to divide the area into subsidiary zones that have been
subjected to different usages over different lengths of time, which could result
in different levels of confidence about whether or not some subsidiary zones can
be considered eligible for cancellation. Suspected or Confirmed Hazardous Areas
(SHAs/CHAs) can also be subdivided when different contamination types are
identified in different subsidiary zones and when different technical methodologies
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may be deployed in different subsidiary zones. For example, metal fragmentation
mines with tripwires have been seen in one subsidiary zone and large, partiallyburied anti-vehicle mines in another.
The implementation of subsidiary zones during NTS should be further reviewed
during the conduct of technical interventions, in order to continually improve the
NTS process.

EVIDENCE
The evidence collected by NTS teams falls into two broad categories: indirect
evidence and direct evidence.
National standards should define what constitutes indirect and direct evidence and
these definitions should also be reflected in the relevant organisational Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs). Each country should ensure that its definitions of
indirect and direct evidence are appropriate for its own context and not copied
verbatim from International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Generally speaking,
indirect evidence is second-hand, more informal information about possible
Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination. Direct evidence is first-hand evidence
that strongly indicates the presence of EO contamination.

Survey team collecting information immediately post conflict, Sri Lanka, 2009
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Interview with farmers, Colombia, 2012

Indirect evidence
Verbal indirect evidence comes from second-hand sources of information. Secondhand sources are people that did not actually see the Explosive Ordnance being
placed/used and did not have any role in its placement or use.
Another source of indirect evidence is one more stage removed from the secondhand source. These are sources that have not actually seen the EO being placed/
used but have been told about the hazard by a third party who may only be
repeating what they have heard. Indirect evidence may come from informants
who have, for example, heard that there was once an accident in the area but
don’t know exactly where it was.
The third source of indirect evidence could also be the information that comes
from historical sources and records, that have either previously been proven to be
unreliable or their reliability and accuracy have yet to be assessed.
IMAS 08.10 (Non-Technical Survey) provides some examples of what may constitute indirect evidence:
• Potentially productive land not in use;
• Second or third-hand verbal reports from local population/former combatants;
• EO records, where the reliability of such records remains open to doubt or

has not been assessed;
• Analysis of other known contamination areas, tactics and historical sources;
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• Known former combat zones;
• Existence of trenches and barbed wire;
• Reports from previous surveys, which are not supported by direct evidence

of the presence of contamination;
• EO accidents or incidents where the location of the event cannot be

accurately identified;
• The presence of components that could potentially be used in the

construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which is specific to
the local context.

Direct evidence

Photo: Colin King/Fenix Insight Ltd

The best form of direct evidence is EO that can be observed and recorded by
the NTS team. A traditional NTS team would have to observe this evidence from
a safe area, without entering the hazardous area. The team may be equipped
with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which could be flown over any area of
interest. The UAV would seek visual confirmation of any threat, without requiring
any NTS team member to physically enter the area. If the NTS team also has a
Technical Survey (TS) component, the TS component may enter the area and seek
further confirmation of the EO contamination. The implementation of TS requires
a significantly greater level of deployment than NTS. It also requires full medical
and casualty evacuation support to be on hand.

The characteristic signature from the detonation of a BLU-97 in Kosovo. It is likely that
unexploded submunitions will be found nearby
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Another form of direct evidence would be items that are associated with EO
contamination. In the case of mines or cluster submunitions, this might be
packaging materials observed in the vicinity. In certain contexts, where previous
experience has shown it to be the case, the physical identification of military
positions could indicate the presence of EO. In these cases, the NTS team should
try to identify which side of the military position was most likely to have been
approached by enemy forces, because this side is more likely to have been
protected with mines.
NTS teams should be trained not only to recognise the most common items of EO
that they are likely to encounter in the area but also some of the most recognisable
component parts of the EO. Members of local communities will often pick up parts
of EO; this practice should, of course, be discouraged and risk education training
for the communities be provided in these instances. However, if some parts of EO
have been collected, the NTS team can gain valuable evidence about the nature
of the threat from these parts.

Photo: Colin King/Fenix Insight Ltd

Some examples of this would be the tell-tale small parachutes and spider-like end
caps associated with BLU-97 cluster strikes or the very distinctive springs that are
found at the front of the BL-755 submunition. Likewise, local communities may
have gathered pieces from locations where mines have previously detonated;
these pieces can indicate the precise model of mine that was used.

Abandoned bombs in Mozambique, where surrounding undergrowth increases the risk
from bush fires
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If the threat comes from tripwire-activated mines, those placing the mines may
have left empty wire spools in the vicinity. The spools would have been used to
store the tripwires prior to unwinding them and then discarded after use. The
tripwires associated with mines are often tied to either metal or wooden stakes,
and if the mines themselves are not visible, it may be possible to make out these
tether stakes. At certain times of the year, the tripwires themselves are more likely
to be visible in the early morning, when dew has settled on them during the night,
thus making them appear as a line of water drops.
NTS teams should not remove any physical evidence from the location it was
found in, as the evidence may be hazardous. It is not the role of the NTS team to
make technical judgements about what evidence may or may not pose a hazard.
Physical evidence should not be handled as this could present a threat to the
team members and set a bad precedent for local communities. If it is safe to do
so, physical evidence should be photographed with a scale beside it and then
included in the NTS report.
In certain cases, direct evidence may also come from historical sources and
records that have previously been shown to be accurate and reliable. This would
be the case if any minefield records existed and those minefield records had been
shown to be accurate in other locations.
The most common form of direct evidence comes from people with first-hand
knowledge of the location and type of EO. This includes former and serving
military who may have been involved in the emplacement of the EO or any
subsequent clearance efforts. Direct evidence can also come from individuals who
have ventured into areas not normally used by other people, such as woodcutters
or subsistence farmers, who may have observed items that would otherwise
have been missed. Likewise, any victims of EO will be able to provide information
about the location of their accident and perhaps information about what it was
that injured them.
IMAS 08.10 also highlights some examples of direct evidence:
• EO records, where the reliability of such records has been confirmed

during previous operations
• Visual observation of EO, EO parts, fragmentation or craters
• Detonations by burning or by animals
• Mine signs, fencing, ancillary equipment (boxes, cannisters), etc.

associated with contamination
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• EO accidents or incidents where the location of the event can be accurately

determined
• Information from military or former military who laid mines in the area
• Information from local population who have seen EO contamination
• Bombing data from proven and reliable sources
• Tactical assessment based on previous experience of EO hazards in

comparable areas
• Wreckage of vehicles that have been damaged/destroyed by anti-vehicle mines

In some contexts, it may also be appropriate to consider any visible evidence of
IEDs, which could include the following: partially exposed wires, pressure plates,
locally manufactured main charges, etc. Nationally developed, evidence-based
guidelines are highly recommended to support the Land Release process.

CRITERIA FOR THE DEFINITION OF
AN SHA AND CHA
The precise criteria used to define the status of an area as being either free from
any suspicion of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination, suspected of being
contaminated (SHA) or confirmed as being contaminated (CHA) should be
defined in national standards and, by extension, in operators’ Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs).
Some national standards specify that an area needs to have been ploughed for at
least three years, with nothing found, before it can be considered for cancellation.
This is merely an example; different criteria will need to be established for different
countries and conditions.
National standards, evidence-based guidelines and SOPs should provide a list of
sources of both indirect and direct evidence that can be used to determine the
classification of the information and how that then leads to the classification of
the associated hazardous area.
The criteria to be used for creating, refining, differentiating between, and partially
or wholly cancelling SHAs and CHAs should be clear, agreed and understood by
36
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Direct evidence would generally lead to the creation of a CHA in the form of a polygon, the
starting point for clearance operations. This shows a minefield control point in Angola, 2007

all involved. The criteria are typically developed through a process of discussion
and agreement between stakeholders.
The national mine action authority (NMAA) should develop criteria to:
a. promote consistent definitions of what constitutes SHAs and CHAs;
b. promote the recording of spot Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks,

where appropriate;
b. promote uniform application of land cancellation, reduction and clearance

processes amongst operators;
c. simplify the management of land cancellation, reduction and clearance

processes;
d. provide a framework for states that needs to document and demonstrate

compliance with international conventions; and
e. provide an auditable trail of documented decisions that may assist with

resolving questions relating to any future liability in the case of EO incidents.
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NTS training course, Lebanon, 2018

Indirect evidence would generally lead to the creation of an SHA and direct
evidence would generally lead to the creation of a CHA. Once a hazardous area
has been defined as either an SHA or a CHA, the NTS team should carefully and
accurately delineate the boundaries of the area.
One key condition for the cancellation of any area through Non-Technical Survey
is that “all reasonable effort” has been applied throughout the process. What
constitutes “all reasonable effort” should be defined in the appropriate national
standards but for cancellation to be considered appropriate, the NTS team must
be able to demonstrate that there is no evidence of EO contamination in the area.
For the absence of evidence to be taken as justification for cancellation it must be
shown that, had contamination been present, all of the efforts applied could have
been reasonably expected to have found that contamination.
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EVIDENCE-BASED, DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
Any decisions related to the definition of Explosive Ordnance Disposal spot tasks,
SHAs, CHAs and areas to be cancelled should be taken on the basis of available
evidence. The quality and quantity of the available evidence is the foundation upon
which the quality and reliability of decisions will be made. As these decisions
could potentially result in death or serious injury if incorrect, it is vital that they
are not taken lightly and that they are subject to continual review and, wherever
possible, improvement.
All evidence needs to be continually compared and reviewed, in order to provide
the mine action community with the best information available.
NTS teams should be aware of the types of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination
they are likely to encounter in their specific areas of operation and how that EO
contamination is likely to have been used. Any finds of previously unknown EO or
previously unknown methods of deployment should be fed back into the system,
in order for NTS teams to continually improve their knowledge base.
If appropriate, NTS teams should be trained to understand the effects of the
passage of time on the sensitivity of EO, the distribution of EO and its detectability.
For example, over a period of time springs and safety pins are likely to rust, and
containers may become deformed after exposure to hot and cold temperatures.
Likewise, mines planted on a slope could start sliding downhill once subject to
sufficient environmental exposure.
The evidence collected during NTS should be compared with the evidence, or lack
thereof, collected during any subsequent technical interventions. This acts as a
form of quality management for the NTS process and helps to build confidence
that the process is continually improving. It also helps to establish evidence about
the respective reliability of different information sources.
Should there be any adverse events involving EO in land that was previously
cancelled, reduced or cleared, it is vital to review the evidence-based decisionmaking process to look for means of improvement and to minimise the possibility
of any more adverse events.

A Guide to Non-Technical Survey

|

39

It is vital that the use of all appropriate evidence in support of decision-making
is documented, in order to establish and maintain confidence in Non-Technical
Survey and in the overall land release process. Such evidence should also be
transparent and made available to support any investigations into matters relating
to liability.

BASIC IDENTIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVE
ORDNANCE
Non-Technical Survey (NTS) teams should always be trained to recognise the
most common types of Explosive Ordnance (EO) that they are likely to encounter
during operations. At the very minimum, NTS teams should be able to identify the
different classifications of EO. For example, every member of an NTS team should
be able to distinguish between a mine, a hand grenade, an artillery projectile and
a missile. Whilst ideal, it is not always a requirement that an NTS team member
should know the precise model of the EO that has been found but the team
member should be able to make a generic identification.

Bounding fragmentation mine
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NTS team members should never handle EO and should instruct informants never
to handle or disturb EO. Even if the NTS team member knows that the EO is safe to
move, doing so sets a precedent in affected communities that may lead members
of those communities to handle EO in the future.

Photos of EO or suspicious objects
NTS team members should be trained to take clear photographs of Explosive
Ordnance items and suspicious objects. These photographs should always be
taken from safe ground and it should be remembered that, although having
photographs of an item is ideal, safety should not be compromised in order to
take those photographs.

Identification of EO items, NTS training course, Lebanon, 2018

It is often difficult to tell the size of items on digital images without using some sort
of scale. However, for NTS teams it is not always possible to place a ruler or other
object beside the item, without compromising their safety. On those occasions
where it is safe to do so, the NTS team may place a ruler beside the item to provide
approximate dimensions for those interpreting the images.
Should the NTS team be equipped with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) this
would generally be the preferred method of recording images of the item.
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GPS coordinates of EO or suspicious objects
The location of the EO item or the suspicious object should be accurately recorded
using a global positioning system (GPS). National standards and Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) should specify which GPS map datum system
should be used and all GPS units should be configured to operate on the same
system. Generally speaking, the map datum used on the GPS should be the same
as the map datum used on any physical or digital maps that exist of the area,
otherwise significant errors may arise between the position shown on the GPS unit
and the map. Different areas of the world use different map data, so it is important
to verify with the national mine action authority (NMAA) which map datum should
be used in a specific country.
Organisations conducting NTS should implement appropriate quality management
processes for the collection, recording and reporting of information. Senior
operational personnel should review NTS reports, prior to those reports being
submitted for data entry. After that, database managers should provide survey
team leaders with copies of database entries, including maps, for review before
they are formally accepted in the database. This helps to prevent erroneous entries
from being disseminated further.
If a Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA)/Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) is
established, its perimeter should be recorded using GPS. In order to assist other
teams to locate the area in the future, a benchmark and/or a reference point will
need to be identified and these locations recorded using GPS.

NTS field accreditation, Colombia, 2013
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Global Non-Technical Survey course, Germany, 2016

Marking of SHA/CHA/EO
The temporary marking of any identified SHA/CHA/EO is normally the role of the
NTS team that has identified it. Marking is carried out in accordance with the
organisation’s SOPs and national standards. If there are no national standards in
use, the organisation shall ensure that its SOPs conform to IMAS 08.40 (Marking
Mine and UXO Hazards).
The perimeter of the SHA/CHA is normally marked with warning tape and/
or hazard signs that clearly warn people not to enter the area. If the follow-up
technical intervention is likely to occur after a considerable delay, it may be
necessary to visit the marked location periodically to maintain the marking. Local
populations should be briefed about the meaning of the marking system that has
been used.
Individual items of EO should be marked in accordance with SOPs. These will
specify the distance around the item that should be maintained during the marking
process. Items of EO should never be moved or otherwise disturbed during the
marking process.
It will be necessary for the NTS team to mark the location of the benchmark and
any reference points, so that the location can be easily identified in the future.
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This is generally achieved using spray paint on identifiable points. Buildings are
often used as both benchmarks and reference points, in which case permission
from the building’s owner should be sought prior to spray painting.

Example of a hazard sign

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The information that is collected, recorded and reported by NTS teams is the foundation upon which the Land Release (LR) process rests. Therefore, it is imperative
that the information is of the highest quality possible and that it is recorded and
reported as accurately as possible.
All stakeholders should ensure that the NTS documentation satisfies quality
requirements and reflects the needs of all information users. The information
should be collected in a systematic manner and should conform to a common
44
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reporting standard, which should be established in the national mine action
standards. Should any shortcomings or nonconformities be found in the quality
of the information collected during NTS, appropriate corrective and preventive
action should be taken. The constant re-evaluation of evidence should be part of
the LR process.
Whatever the reporting standard that is established, all of the raw evidence that
has been collected during NTS should be retained by a competent authority. In
the case of any future problem regarding the decisions made as a result of NTS,
the raw evidence may help to establish if there was any discrepancy between the
raw evidence and the NTS reporting system.
The information collected during NTS will form a key part of the documentation
that is to be handed over to those teams that will carry out future technical
interventions and it will be included in the documentation required for the
subsequent handover of the land.
Location maps should be used when reporting the boundaries of Suspected
Hazardous Areas (SHAs) or Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs). These maps may
be physical or digital maps and should include all turning points of the polygon,
in addition to the location of the benchmark and any reference points. The maps
should be produced to scale and include a north marker and a unique identifier.
Wherever possible, the maps should be detailed enough to show the location of
any direct evidence of Explosive Ordnance contamination.
Turning points are normally recorded by global positioning systems (GPS) and
when overlaid on a map, care should be taken to ensure that the precise location
of the polygon is accurately represented on the map. Some older maps lack the
accuracy commonly associated with GPS, so although the GPS coordinates may
be correct, once overlaid on an inaccurate map, the SHA/CHA may be shown to
be in the “wrong” location. If this is the case, it should be brought to the attention
of the Information Management department.

A Guide to Non-Technical Survey

|

45

NTS TEAM REQUIREMENTS
The composition, equipment and training of NTS teams varies from country to
country and also from organisation to organisation. NTS teams are rarely formed
to only conduct NTS and will usually be expected to fulfil other functions, such as
Mine Risk Education, marking, Community Liaison and, in some cases, Technical
Survey (TS). Therefore, there is a considerable variation in the composition,
equipment and training required for each team.

NPA NTS team, Zimbabwe, 2013

NTS teams need to possess a combination of both interpersonal and technical
skills. The interpersonal skills assist with gaining the confidence of the local
population, in order to gather the relevant information. The technical skills required
fall into three different skill sets:
• the requisite knowledge about the Explosive Ordnance (EO) found in the

region and how it was used;
• the ability to critically analyse the information collected to make informed

decisions about the location of EO contamination and;
• the ability to accurately record and map the information.
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Team composition and training
The precise composition of any NTS team will vary in accordance with the
additional roles that the team may also be tasked with. Most organisations
establish NTS teams composed of 4-6 members, which includes a team leader,
driver and surveyors.
Wherever possible, the NTS team leader should be an experienced deminer, with
a good background in the nature and methods of use of EO in the region. The
team leader should also have good interpersonal and technical skills. In mature
programmes, where appropriate individuals are available, someone such as a
former demining team leader with the requisite skills should be considered for
the role of NTS team leader.
If NTS teams are also tasked to implement some form of limited TS, as some
organisations do, a dedicated medic and a casualty evacuation vehicle will also
be required. If the NTS team is not undertaking any form of intrusive intervention,
there may be no requirement for a dedicated medic but it is good practice to
ensure that the team members have received first-aid training. Of course, those
NTS teams implementing limited TS will need to include trained deminers.
The NTS team should, whenever possible, incorporate members of both genders,
which allows for a more culturally-sensitive approach and should enable a better
quality of information to be collected, once the different gender perspectives have
been taken into account. Having a team with both genders is especially important
when the cultural context makes it inappropriate for different genders to interact
with one another. The different genders may have different and complementary/
contradictory information about EO contamination, so it is important that they are
both consulted. In addition to gender, there may be other diversity considerations
to bear in mind; this is especially the case when dealing with distinct ethnic
minorities, who may feel more comfortable talking to members of their own
ethnicity, rather than to members of the main ethnic group.
Team members should be culturally sensitive and able to fluently communicate
with the population that they are working with. When populations are ethnically or
linguistically diverse, care should be taken to ensure that this diversity is reflected
within the NTS team.
NTS team members will need to be able to critically analyse the information they
are given and then accurately record it, both on the ground and in the required
reporting format.
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Team equipment
As with the team composition, the team equipment will vary from organisation
to organisation and from country to country, as it is dependent upon whatever
additional roles the NTS team may be asked to fulfil.
The basic level of equipment that any NTS team should carry will be specified in
the appropriate Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), however, a suggested list
is as follows:
a. Minimum of 2 GPS units with spare batteries
b. Laser rangefinder
c. Appropriate equipment for environmental conditions (rain gear, warm

clothes, sun hat etc.)
d. Handheld VHF radios (for communication between team members)
e. Reliable means of communication with HQ (mobile/satellite phone, etc.)
f. Camera
g. First aid kit
h. Mine marking signs, hammer and nails
i. Compass (preferably prismatic)
j. Ruler
k. Measuring tape
m. Paint for benchmark
n. Mine marking tape
o. A4 millimetre paper for sketch map
p. A0 paper for community map
q. Required paperwork (task folder, travel authorisation, notebook, data entry

forms/reports etc.)
r. Pens, pencils, markers
s. Emergency food and water (as appropriate)
t. Vehicle(s) appropriate for the terrain and large enough to transport all team

members and equipment
u. Photographs of the most commonly encountered EO
v. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), as deemed necessary
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NTS team equipment

Many organisations are moving towards equipping NTS teams with electronic
means of recording and transmitting the information received. However, NTS
teams should still take paper forms as a backup, in case of any technical problems.
If the team is also trained and tasked to undertake TS, it should also be equipped
with the appropriate detectors, a dedicated medic, a medical trauma pack and a
casualty evacuation vehicle.
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TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
FOR NTS TEAMS
Good quality training and recruitment of NTS teams is vital to ensure high quality
NTS. Wherever possible, some NTS team members should be experienced
deminers with good knowledge of the nature of local Explosive Ordnance (EO)
contamination.
NTS teams should be trained in both soft (interpersonal) and hard (technical) skills
required to carry out their role.
Some suggested topics for an NTS training syllabus are as follows:
1.		Five pillars of mine action
2.		Introduction to mine action in the relevant country (current situation,

coordination, other actors)
3.		Land Release concept and processes
4.		NTS standards, from IMAS to NMAS to SOPs
5.		Basic identification of EO
6.		History of the conflict
7.		Mine laying and military tactics in the country
8.		Identifying/managing sources of information
9.		Critical thinking – managing, classifying and recognising evidence
10.	Datum and coordinates system (i.e. latitude/longitude and Universal

Transverse Mercator – UTM)
11.		 Map scales
12. Map reading (topographical, satellite, aerial photo, Google Earth)
13. Use of GPS (set up and logging and retrieving waypoints)
14. Use of compass (normal and prismatic)
15. Bearings and distance (tape measure, rangefinder, distance estimations)
16. Mapping (hand-drawn sketch map and ArcGIS)
17.		 Delivery of basic risk education
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18.	Interview techniques and communication skills (avoidance prepping,

closed or leading questions, interviews during community meetings and
individual interviews)
19. Cultural and customary understanding, and behaviour and gender roles
20. First aid and MEDEVAC
21.		Communications
22. Reporting
23.	Vehicle driving and maintenance (daily checks, tyre changes, use of fire

extinguisher, etc.)
24. Information Management systems

NTS training course, Lebanon, 2018
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
PRINCIPLES FOR NTS
Information Management (IM) involves the collection, storage, analysis of data
and use of information. Non-Technical Survey (NTS) is a key component in the
collection of information. All IM processes and procedures should be implemented
in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 05.10 (Information
Management for Mine Action), national mine action standards (NMAS) and
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
The IM system should have the capability to analyse the information provided by
NTS teams and look for both commonalities and outliers in the data provided.
The responsibility for good IM is the responsibility of the whole organisation,
rather than just the IM department itself. Organisations should try to ensure that
IM is embedded in the awareness and training of operational staff and is seen as
an integral part of the overall mine action team, rather than being a stand-alone
entity. Both operational staff and IM staff should have a good understanding of the
roles and requirements of both sides, to allow them to work together to establish
optimal solutions.
The national mine action authority (NMAA) shall establish a national standard for
the format of NTS reporting, which is to be used by all organisations accredited to
undertake NTS. Wherever possible, this national standard should be in compliance
with IMAS minimum data requirements. Individual organisations may have to
collect additional information as part of their requirements for donors, but the
additional information should not be interspersed with the information required
by the NMAA.
The information gathered by NTS should be subject to quality management
prior to being entered into the organisation’s IM system. Once entered into the
Information Management system, the NTS team leader should verify that the entry
corresponds to the base documentation. The information will be further checked
by the IM manager and the operations officer prior to being sent to the NMAA for
entry into the national database.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NTS AND TS
The Land Release (LR) process generally starts with NTS and then leads on
to TS and clearance, if warranted by the evidence found at each stage. All of
these elements involve the collection, analysis and verification of evidence. NTS
is normally the default first element in the LR process because it is more cost
efficient and gives a logical evidence-based approach upon which to decide if any
technical intervention is needed.
NTS and TS complement each other in the LR process and some organisations
embed a TS capability within NTS teams. The aim of using TS elements in support
of NTS is to immediately verify or disprove the evidence produced by NTS.
This either leads to a more accurate definition of the perimeters of Confirmed
Hazardous Areas (CHAs) or more areas being cancelled, or if they are new areas,
not being recorded in the first place.
If an organisation embeds a TS component within an NTS team, this component
generally consists of trained and experienced manual deminers equipped with
detectors. Owing to the small size of the TS component, the TS carried out will
be limited and targeted at specific areas. The aim of the TS is to either confirm

NTS training course, Thailand, 2016
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that evidence of Explosive Ordnance contamination exists or to build confidence
that areas are safe to be used.
In addition to the TS component, NTS teams may also have an Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) component, which is able to deal with spot Explosive Ordnance
Disposal tasks. When there is a Multi-Tasking Team, it is crucial that the reporting
is clear, and no double entries or incorrect attributions of LR methodologies are
linked with certain activities (e.g. cancellation of area should always be through
NTS and not TS, etc).

COMMUNICATION IN NTS
The skills required for effective NTS can be divided into hard and soft skills. Hard
skills are those associated with the technical aspects of NTS, such as identifying
Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination and recording hazardous areas. Soft
skills for NTS are those skills involved in establishing interpersonal and culturally
appropriate connections that encourage sources to want to provide information
to the NTS team.
The NTS team should always dress and behave in a culturally appropriate manner.
The NTS team should identify all relevant sources of information in a community
and ensure that information from these sources is appropriately collected and
recorded. NTS teams rely on the goodwill of the communities and it is vital to
maintain that goodwill.
NTS teams should be aware that repeated visits to the same informant may result
in an increasing level of “survey fatigue”, so this should be avoided whenever
possible.

Interview techniques
When asking questions, always be polite and appreciative of the information that
is received. The informants are under no obligation to provide any information
at all, so NTS teams should try to create an atmosphere of mutual assistance;
the community is helping the NTS team to do its job and the NTS is helping the
community to deal with whatever EO contamination problem may exist.
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Interview technique learning, global Non-Technical Survey course, Germany, 2016

Prior to beginning the interview, the interviewee should be made aware of the
purpose of the NTS and asked if s/he is willing to cooperate. The interview should
be carried out in a friendly, informal manner that encourages the interviewee to
offer relevant information. Care should be taken to avoid making the interviewee
feel uncomfortable and also to avoid the interview resembling any kind of
interrogation.
Effective interviewing requires a structured approach that is both professional and
efficient. The PRICE model of interviewing is recommended as being an approach
that is ethical, fair and achieves consistent results.
PRICE is a mnemonic standing for:
• Planning and preparation
• Rapport
• Information
• Clarifying and confirming
• Evaluation
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Planning and preparation

Effective interviewing is based on good preparation and planning. A list of
questions should be prepared that can be used to gather information from all
prospective informants. These questions establish the criteria required for a
successful interview. There will also be a requirement to assess the reliability of
each prospective informant and not only the information that they provide.
Rapport

At the start of the interview the aim should be to establish the right level of rapport
with informants. The aim of the interview is to obtain good quality information.
Putting informants at ease means that they are much more likely to talk freely.
In some cases, several meetings might be required to ensure a good level of
confidence is established with the informants.
Information

Think of the interview as a structured conversation. The role of the interviewer is to
give direction to that conversation by asking appropriate questions and steering it
in the right direction. The aim should be for the informant to do most of the talking
and the interviewer to do most of the listening.
Clarifying and confirming

Encourage a free flow of information from the interviewee, let them tell their story.
Try not to interrupt, take note of questions you want to ask after the interviewee
has finished. Informants must be given the opportunity to ask any questions of
their own. At the end of the interview the interviewer should explain the next steps
in the mine action process.
Evaluation

After the interview the interviewer needs to evaluate the information collected
against the criteria established during the preparation phase. For example, whether
the interviewer feels that s/he has all of the information required to establish the
perimeter of any hazardous area and the contact details of the informant in case
any follow-up information is required.
Patience is a worthy attribute and it may be necessary to politely listen to other
concerns voiced by the community, while gently trying to steer the interview
back on topic.
Although the actual questions themselves may be presented in list form, the way
they are asked should be as neutral and open as possible, without trying to lead
the interviewee into making certain statements. The NTS team should avoid the
possibility of implying that some answers would be preferred over others.
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Whenever possible, questions should be open rather than closed. This means that
questions with either a yes or a no answer should be discouraged. People should
be encouraged to discuss their knowledge of EO contamination in the local area
in a general way to begin with before asking them for any specific locations.
The NTS team will require the ability to think critically about the information they
are receiving, in order to evaluate the reliability of both the information and the
informant. For example, if an informant tells the team that a certain path has not
been used for years, yet there is no vegetation on it and footsteps are clearly
visible, it is clear that this information is incorrect. However, it is important to verify
as the informant may actually be discussing a different path, so the error may be
with the NTS team rather than the informant.

Cross-cultural communication
In post-conflict situations involving different ethnicities speaking different
languages, it is often helpful to have an NTS team made up of the different
ethnicities. This would also be the case in areas where ethnic minorities are
present.
In addition to always dressing and behaving in a culturally appropriate manner,
NTS teams should research, if required, the appropriate cultural behaviour in the
different contexts they are likely to be working in.

Interviewing a member of the local community, Colombia, 2013
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Mainstreaming gender in NTS ensures that the contributions, concerns and needs
of all members of affected communities are acknowledged and addressed without
bias. This also benefits the whole community by ensuring a more coherent,
holistic, multidimensional response to the different needs of mine-affected
women, girls, boys and men. Gender mainstreaming in NTS is not only about
equality, it is also about quality.
In addition to gender and age, there are other criteria that characterise different
groups of people. These need to be taken into account to ensure that mine action
benefits everyone equally. Roles, mobility patterns and knowledge of contamination differ due to gender and age, but are also influenced by other aspects, such as
class, job, language, race, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, education, sexual
orientation, literacy, disability, residency status/migration history, etc. These and
other aspects are referred to as “diversity”.
The NTS team should be made up of both male and female members, so that,
if cultural norms require, male and female participants may be interviewed
separately by members of their own gender.
The survey should be structured in such a way that both male and female
informants with specific knowledge about potentially EO-contaminated areas are
interviewed as part of the process.

Equality and inclusion considerations for NTS
It should always be borne in mind that once those in leadership positions have
spoken, those in less fortunate positions are often unwilling to say anything that
could be considered to be against the “party line”.
Where appropriate, separate meetings should be arranged with households, family
groups, female informants and children respectively, as these groups might be
prevented from participating fully in mixed group meetings.
Additionally, the times and venues of meetings should take into account the roles
and responsibilities of each group, to avoid inadvertently excluding one group
because of their occupation or because of their different level of mobility.
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QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Like any mine action activity, Non-Technical Survey (NTS) should be subject to
quality management (QM), with the goal of continual improvement. QM will occur
both internally (within the organisation) and externally (by the national mine action
authority or a suitably qualified and accredited proxy).
NTS should be seen as part of the Land Release process, rather than as a standalone activity, and therefore subject to the same demanding quality management
process applying to all operations. This is important because the best quality
management of NTS is to compare the evidence it has gathered to the evidence
collected during any subsequent technical intervention or to any adverse event
post-cancellation.

Internal process
QM of NTS, as in other mine action activities, can be dividing into quality assurance
(QA) of the processes of NTS and quality control (QC) of the product of NTS.
The internal QA process will focus on ensuring that:
a. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been followed;
b. relevant, logical and clear decisions have been made;
c. necessary evidence has been collected and correctly documented in

report forms designed with an agreed level of detail and;
d. the most relevant and reliable information sources have been found

and used.
The internal QC process is focussed on the quality of the product of NTS, which is
the information (evidence) and the decisions made on the basis of that evidence.
As such, the QC process should ensure that the information produced by NTS is:
a. Relevant;
b. Complete and;
c. Accurate.
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The above points should include such questions as:
a. Were the correct GPS coordinates given for the location in question?
b. Does the sketch map correspond to the electronic map?
c. Does the sketch map contain all relevant information?
d. Was the type of Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination correctly

recorded?
e. Was the perimeter of the hazardous area correctly identified and marked?
f. Were the names and contact details of sources correctly recorded?
g. If land has been cancelled, has the local community indicated their

confidence that the cancelled land may be used?
In addition to the information produced by NTS, the internal QC process should
verify the quality of the decisions made on the basis of that evidence:
a. Were the decisions made in accordance with the criteria laid down in

SOPs and national mine action standards (NMAS)?
b. Are the decisions that have been made logical in this particular context?
c. Is there consistency between the decisions made by different teams or

by the same team in different areas?
Although there is generally no technical sampling conducted of land cancelled by
NTS, the subsequent use of that land will indicate the quality of the decisions made
during NTS. Any adverse event could indicate that the decision made to cancel the
land needs to be reviewed. This is not always the case, as findings of individual
items of EO would not generally indicate that a review is required. Individual items
of EO would generally be determined to constitute residual risk.
If the NTS team has recommended the cancellation of an area, it is vital that the
recommendation is endorsed by a series of senior actors within the organisation
before the recommendation is acted upon. The QC system should ensure that this
process has been rigorously followed and documented.
The most informative method of internal QC occurs when the polygon defined by
NTS is then subject to technical interventions. The locations and characteristics
of any actual contamination discovered during technical interventions will be
compared with the expected results of NTS. This will provide a clear relationship
between the actual situation and the accuracy and completeness of the evidence
that was described in the survey.
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Any subsequent technical intervention will demonstrate if NTS was correct about
the type of EO contamination and how closely the boundaries of the polygon were
drawn in relation to the boundaries of the actual hazardous area.

External process
External quality management of the NTS teams should be undertaken by the
national mine action authority (NMAA) or a suitably qualified and accredited
organisation on behalf of the NMAA.
Just like the internal QM processes described in the previous section, external
QM will involve both quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). QA will
examine the quality of the processes, which examines whether or not NTS was
implemented in accordance with the relevant SOPs. This involves ensuring that
the team is carrying all of the correct team equipment and that the equipment is
functioning correctly, in addition to ensuring that the team is implementing the
NTS process in accordance with SOPs.
With the field report forms, the QC process will examine the quality of the outputs
from the NTS teams, which are the evidence gathered and the decisions made,
based on that evidence. External QM will compare the evidence produced by the
NTS teams to the evidence produced by any future technical interventions, or
future adverse event, for indications of accuracy or inaccuracy.
It is possible that the organisation conducting a technical intervention after NTS
is not the same organisation that conducted the survey. In these instances, the
NMAA should ensure that the results of the technical interventions are shared
with the organisation conducting the NTS, so that the process may benefit from
the feedback.
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SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE FIELD

As in all mine action activities, safety and security are paramount in the conduct
of NTS. The NTS team leader should detail a brief CASEVAC plan on arrival at
every new site.
The risks to NTS teams are not limited to the risks associated with Explosive
Ordnance (EO) but also include such aspects as driving in developing countries
and the prevailing security situation in the areas of operation.
NTS is typically an activity that does not require any team members to enter
hazardous areas. As such, there should not be a requirement for a dedicated medic
in an NTS team. However, NTS team members should be trained in basic first aid
and the team should be equipped with a basic first aid kit. This is not intended for
the treatment of casualties caused by EO but rather for the treatment of everyday
injuries that may occur.
The NTS team should always inform headquarters (HQ) of the location to be visited
and the route to be taken. It may also be appropriate that the NTS team checks in
with HQ at regular intervals throughout the day. This will require a reliable means
of communication with HQ; this should be a mobile phone, satellite phone or HF
radio, depending upon the local circumstances.
The NTS team should be aware of any movement restrictions that may be in place
in the area of operations and coordinate with the relevant authorities to ensure
compliance with these restrictions.
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The NTS team should be aware of the location of the nearest medical facility and
the route to it. In more remote locations, there may be a requirement to research
the location of nearby airstrips or possible helicopter landing sites, if applicable.
NTS team members should only walk or drive in areas where there is no evidence
of EO contamination and significant evidence of previous use of such areas.
If following an informant towards a potentially hazardous area, team members
should only travel on well-used paths or areas that have been cultivated. When
following an informant, it is important to ask that informant to stop some distance
from the potentially hazardous area and to indicate the area from afar.
Informants should be dissuaded from walking into or throwing any objects into
potentially hazardous areas.
If the NTS team contains an embedded TS component, all of the relevant Standard
Operating Procedures specifying the safety precautions to be taken, should be
followed.

RISK EDUCATION AFTER NTS
Non-Technical Survey (NTS) teams may have to be double-hatted and required to
perform risk education, in addition to the NTS role. In this instance the NTS team
will perform both NTS and risk education.

Risk education in Laos, 2008
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For NTS teams that are not formally tasked with implementing the risk education
role, there could still be a requirement to provide a basic level of risk education to
affected communities, this includes a clear explanation of which areas have been
marked as hazardous.
• Affected communities need to understand the requirement to stay out of

those areas that have been temporarily marked as hazardous.
• Adult members of the community should ensure that children are made

aware of the meaning of the marking and of the requirement to respect it.
• Affected communities should be made aware of the requirement to leave

the marking in place and not to remove it.

Risk education in Iraq, 2018

Affected communities should be told that if any future suspected items of
Explosive Ordnance (EO) are found they are not to be moved or otherwise
disturbed. A reporting mechanism for any suspected items of EO should be
established, to allow the affected community to report any future finds.

64

|

A Guide to Non-Technical Survey

TECHNOLOGY IN NTS
As in other areas of mine action, technology is playing a valuable role in the
modernisation and increased effectiveness and efficiency of NTS. The two most
meaningful contributions that technology has made to NTS are in the use of mobile
applications and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). UAS are often referred to as drones.

Mobile applications
Mobile applications allow the NTS teams to digitally collect data during field visits.
The mobile application will be in the same format as the paper NTS forms but the
data fields can be completed using a
tablet or similar device. The advantage of using mobile applications is
that the data can be remotely transmitted to the Information Management section whenever a mobile
phone data connection is available.
This saves a great deal of time and
eliminates the possibility of datainputting errors that are associated
with manually entering paper forms
into databases.
However, mobile applications do not
eliminate the data inputting errors
that may be made by the original NTS
team. As such, it is vital that strong
internal quality management (QM)
controls are put in place to ensure
that the data collected by the NTS
team are accurate before they are
entered into the database.
The mine action reporting system (MARS)

The use of mobile applications can
be used as a management/quality
management tool to verify the activities of the team at given times and
locations.

developed by the GICHD bridges the
information gaps in mine action programmes
and replaces paper forms with digital data
collection tools. Above: making polygons and
adding other sketch features
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Unmanned aerial systems
UAS have proved to be a very valuable tool for NTS teams. The UAS may be fitted
with high definition cameras or thermal imaging sensors. However, a balance has
to be found between the cost of high-end technical systems and the number of
systems that are available to be used by NTS teams.
Cameras can show evidence or the lack of evidence in real-time, although the
recording may require a more detailed analysis to verify details. Thermal imaging
systems can show the difference in temperature that exists between the natural
environment and any metal components. Thermal imaging sensors are more
effective at the beginning of the day, when any metal components would heat up
faster than the surrounding environment.
If UAS are to be used by NTS teams, there will be a requirement to train team
members in their operation and in the maintenance and interpretation of the data
that are produced.

The HALO Trust had this SHA recorded in the national database. The survey team noticed
that it is actively used for agriculture (already for several years) so HALO Trust used
UAS high temporal resolution imagery as proof for cancellation and attached it to the
cancellation report
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IMSMA Core is based on ESRI leading geographical information system (GIS) technology,
thus benefiting from the latest developments; this includes 3D mapping, UAV imagery
integration and data sharing

VISITORS TO NTS OPERATIONS
Any visitors to NTS operations must be thoroughly briefed on all safety aspects
prior to deploying with the team.
• Visitors must agree to stay with the team during operations and not to

unilaterally wander off.
• Visitors should agree to follow the instructions of NTS team members.
• Visitors from outside the organisation may have to sign a waiver absolving

the organisation from any legal responsibility for any accident or injury of
any kind.
• If the NTS team members feel that safety is being compromised in any way,

the visitor should be escorted back to the vehicle and the visit shall end.
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RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS
Any organisation undertaking NTS has a number of responsibilities and obligations
that it must undertake prior to and during the carrying out of NTS operations.
These responsibilities and obligations are as follows:
a. The organisation must be accredited by the national mine action authority

(NMAA or equivalent) to undertake NTS;
b. National standards should be applied. In the absence of national standards,

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) should be applied;
c. The organisation must develop and apply accredited Standard Operating

Procedures (SOPs) for NTS;
d. The organisation must collect all necessary information as required by

the NTS documentation;
e. Where applicable, the organisation shall conduct a formal handover

of assessed sites to those organisations conducting subsequent technical
interventions;
f. All required documentation shall be maintained and made available to

the NMAA on request;
g. The local community, of both genders and all age groups, shall be consulted

with regards to key decisions made by NTS; and
h. Report recipients should provide feedback about the quality, timeliness

and content of the NTS reports, to support the continual improvement
of the process.
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